Year: 2023
Type: dissertation
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: This dissertation considers the importance of prosecutors as legal actors in shaping the welfare of defendants in the US criminal justice system. Broadly, it shows that prosecutor choices have significant impacts on the charges and sentence lengths defendants receive and that racial minorities disproportionately receive harsher punishment from these decisions. In the first chapter, I consider whether changing the costs or benefits to prosecutor charging decisions impacts racial disparities in charges. Prosecutors face a tradeoff between expending resources to gather evidence and building a stronger case. I exploit a circuit split in charging rules to observe variation in the cost of evidence requirements. I compare how prosecutors differentially increase charges for racial minorities across each evidence cost regime by utilizing a bunching point in mandatory minimum charging of federal drug crimes. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that when evidence costs are lowered, prosecutors disproportionately increase charges for Black defendants compared to White counterparts. I then consider how decreases to the expected sentence length for increased charges affects prosecutor choice and racial disparities using the 2018 First Step Act (FSA). I find that in circuits with high evidence costs, the FSA decreased the race gap in increased charges. But in circuits with low required evidence, the FSA increased this disparity. The results suggest that increasing evidence costs is an effective policy tool for reducing racial disparities in charges. In the second chapter I consider the impact of mandatory sentencing. I estimate the actual increase to sentence lengths created by mandatory minimum eligibility for federal drug crimes. I decompose eligibility effects into effects from the law and effects driven by manipulation of cases near the eligibility cutoff. This is done by fitting distributions through non-manipulated cases and extrapolating these distributions into manipulated case areas. I find that without manipulation, mandatory minimum eligibility increases sentence length by around 13 months. This effect is consistent across racial group with small heterogeneity by drug type. However, through manipulation, Black and Hispanic defendants in heroin or cocaine cases receive sentences 20-31 months higher than the counterfactual sentence length. Manipulation has no significant impact on White sentence lengths. Using a unique data set of US Attorneys, I show the race disparity in manipulation effects is tied to prosecutors decisions to increase charges for minority defendants more than White counterparts. Finally, in the last chapter we (my co-author and I) examine the causal effects of prosecutors' incentives on racial and gender disparities. \textit{Blakely v.Washington} 542 U.S. 296 (2004) significantly disincentivized state prosecutors from pursuing sentence enhancements by raising their burdens of proof from ``preponderance of evidence'' to ``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Through a regression discontinuity design, we find that a higher burden of proof reduces defendants' likelihood of receiving a sentence enhancement by 47\%. Furthermore, we find striking evidence that \textit{Blakely} eliminated the entire preexisting gender gap of men being 24\% more likely to receive sentence enhancements than women. However, we find no evidence suggesting a racial gap of sentence enhancements both pre and post \textit{Blakely}.
Authors: Cooper, Spencer, Cooper, Spencer
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6981310651
