Efficient Windows logging for Incident Response : A comparison of logging strategies for malware and threat detection
Year: 2024
Type: dissertation
Abstract: As cyberattacks are becoming increasingly common, so are incidents. Incident responders use information from logs to perform mitigation and recovery, and to prepare for future incidents. Many organisations do not employ measured logging strategies and are consequently only equipped with default configurations, such as the default Windows logging configuration, that produce logs which are insufficient for incident response. The aim of this thesis is to determine the capabilities of common Windows logging strategies when it comes to detecting threats and providing information in the case of an incident investigation. In this study, a comparison was made between three Windows logging configurations: Standard Windows log configuration, Advanced Audit Policy for Windows and the System Monitor (Sysmon) Service for Windows. The three configurations were all exposed to the same series of threats and were scored based both on their ability to generate relevant logs for each threat and on the amount of relevant information included in the logs. The results showed that, unsurprisingly, the Standard Windows log configuration is far from sufficient in both its detection capabilities and in the relevance of the information it provides. It was also confirmed that no single configuration is sufficient to detect all of the threats included in the study. It is therefore recommended to both utilize Advanced Audit Policies and the Sysmon Service when auditing real systems.
Author: Pulls, Ellinor
Institution: KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Language: English
Subfield: Computer Networks and Communications
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6981374407
