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Representation and regional redistribution in federations

Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: This paper examines the role of institutions of territorial representation in\nshaping long-term patterns of inter-regional redistribution within federations. A simple\nlegislative bargaining model with endogenous taxation suggests that over-represented states\nshould be favored in the distribution of inter-governmental grants regardless of their\nincome level. We demonstrate that a striking relationship between legislative representation\nand grants holds up in a diverse group of federations from around the world. The\nrelationship appears not to be an artifact of economic development, population size,\npopulation density, or the historical conditions under which the federal bargain was struck.\nFurthermore, we suggest that the attractiveness of poor states as coalition partners implies\nthat intergovernmental transfer systems will often tend toward progressivity under equal\napportionment, but the systematic over-representation of wealthy (or poor) states can\nundermine (or bolster) this logic.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6986964658
FWCI:
Cites: 46
Cited by: 1
Related to: 9