Analysis of cooperation in the public goods setting
Year: 2021
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This is an experimental study aimed to analyze which incentive -punishment or reward-is better at promoting cooperation under the possibility to free-ride in the framework of the financing of public goods. The main tool that has been used to conduct this study is the Public Goods Game experiment with two of its variations. In the first variation, punishment opportunities were allowed and, in the second one, rewarding opportunities were present. This methodology has allowed the comparison of both incentives against each other and against the standard PGG, revealing their weaknesses and advantages. In line with former research, results have verified that individuals, on average, provide levels of contributions halfway the free-riding and the full provision scenario. Also, while both incentives have been able to prevent the decline of cooperation observed in the standard game, punishment has promoted the highest mean contributions and reward the highest mean payoffs. For such reason, it has been far from easy to determine which one is better overall. In conclusion, this study provides evidence that both punishment and reward can succeed at sustaining cooperation in the PGG setting, although reward can be the optimal force at delivering higher payoffs.
Authors: Ribot Domenech, Arnau, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6989281826