Work

Neural Mechanisms of Preparation in Expectation and Selective Attention

Year: 2024
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The world is complex and constantly changing. We are bombarded by a large \nnumber of stimuli that generate ambiguous patterns in our sensory receptors, \nto which we usually need to give quick and effective responses. To cope with \nthis complexity and ambiguity, among other things, humans use the ability to \nanticipate what is going to happen before it happens. Indeed, it is widely \nbelieved that preparing to perceive impending information improves \nperformance (Barton et al., 2006). However, some fundamental questions \narise from these seemingly self-evident claims. How does preparation improve \nperformance? Does it involve the representation of specific information? And, \nmost importantly, is proactive preparation a unified process or does it employ \ndissociable mechanisms in different cognitive contexts? \nThis thesis frames preparation as a brain process of internal or endogenous \norigin, top-down, referring to the origin of information in higher regions of the \ncortex, which would descend perceptual areas. This definition contrasts with \nanother branch of bottom-up mechanisms, in which the trigger of the activity \nis in the stimuli of the environment. There are at least two possible sources of \ninformation that can lead to this endogenous anticipation: our goals and \nobjectives, and the knowledge we have of the regularities of the environment. \nThe activity associated with goals is related to the internal control of specific \nresources that allow us to effectively perform different tasks. This proactive \ncognitive control (Braver, 2012) is associated with brain regions such as the \nfrontoparietal network or the multiple demand network (Dosenbach et al., \n2007). Among its main capabilities we find the orientation of attention \ntowards relevant information. This selective attention acts as a filter that \nallows us to better process necessary information while ignoring distracting \ninformation. Crucially, it has been shown on numerous occasions that while \nwe select relevant information, this information is represented in the visual \ncortex, through patterns of activity associated with the stimuli we are \nattending to (Peelen & Kastner, 2011; Stokes et al., 2009). Moreover, when \npresented with stimuli that match what is selected, both increases in activity in perceptual regions (Kastner et al., 1999) and greater accuracy in processing \nthose stimuli are often found (Woolgar et al., 2015). \nOn the other hand, models that explain the effects of prior knowledge on the \nstatistical regularities of the environment, or expectations, have gained much \nrelevance in recent years. These predictive processing models (Feldman & \nFriston, 2010; Friston, 2005) highlight how at all times the brain acts as a \nmachine that anticipates what is most likely. These top-down predictions \nwould be contrasted with bottom-up information from sensory receptors. \nFrom the contrast of the two, prediction errors emerge, which are then used \nto update the following predictions and thus give the brain a flexible \nmechanism capable of adapting in different circumstances. These models also \ndescribe how probable information can be represented in the visual cortex \nbefore bottom-up stimulation (de Lange et al., 2018; Kok et al., 2017). \nHowever, in contrast to selective attention, here when a probable stimulus is \nperceived, smaller activations are usually found (Feuerriegel et al., 2021). With \nrespect to the precision of these representations, the evidence is still \nconflicting, and data have been found pointing to both sharpened accuracy \n(Kok et al., 2012) and a dampening of these representations (Richter et al., \n2018). \nAlthough these two phenomena, selective attention and expectation, are \nassociated with different effects during stimulus processing, both involve \nanticipatory representations in visual cortex. However, it has not been \ninvestigated whether these representations share the same processing \nmechanisms, or whether, on the contrary, preparation is a complex and \nheterogeneous phenomenon that depends on the cognitive context in which it \noccurs. \nTherefore, the main goal of this thesis is to examine the nature of preparation, \nand to evaluate how it changes across different contexts. To this end, we \ndesigned a task in which different cues provided information about target \nstimuli. These cues could indicate the relevance (attention) or probability \n(expectation) of the stimuli. This task was implemented in two experiments in which data were collected from different neuroimaging tools. The analyses \nfocused primarily on multivariate techniques (Hebart & Baker, 2018), which \nare particularly sensitive and effective in studying patterns of brain activity \nthat inform how information is represented. \nIn the first two studies, we investigated proactive preparation, exploring how \nanticipated information is represented in the brain, and whether and how it \nchanges across relevance and probability contexts. The first study focused on \nthe temporal dynamics of preparatory activity. For this purpose, brain activity \nwas recorded with Electroencephalography (EEG). The results showed that \nseveral events take place during the preparatory window. First, the perceptual \ncharacteristics of the signal are processed. Then, during most of the trial, \nglobal differences associated with the mechanisms deployed during attention \nand expectation were found. Finally, the anticipatory category was \nrepresented throughout the trial, especially towards the end. Crucially, \nalthough both attention and expectation showed similar decoding accuracies \nand magnification effects, the results of one did not generalize to those of the \nother. This suggests that although anticipatory information is represented in \nthe two conditions, the nature of such representations differs. Finally, we \nsought to explore the level of similarity between preparatory representations \nand stimulus perception. The two conditions differed in the similarity of \npatterns between the cue and the target; specifically, the preparation during \nattention was more similar to the target activity. \nThis first experiment left an important question open: what are the neural \nsubstrates underlying the representations encountered during anticipation? \nWe addressed this question in the second experiment, in which we adapted \nthe behavioral paradigm to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). \nAgain, we found evidence of anticipatory encoding that was different for \nattention and expectation. The results revealed increased activations for \nattention in early visual regions, whereas the posterior cingulate cortex was \nmore active for expectation in this window. In addition, anticipatory \ninformation showed large differences in the involvement of different visual and frontoparietal regions during anticipation, suggesting that different \nnetworks exhibit distinguishable mechanisms in attention and expectation. In \naddition, we found data indicative of category representation in the ventral \nvisual cortex, partially replicating the results of the EEG experiment. We found \nthat the attended and probable categories were represented in nearby, though \nmostly different, regions. Again, cross-classification was not possible between \nattended and expectation, implying that the representational nature of \npreparation in the two conditions was different. When comparing the \nsimilarity between anticipatory representations and stimulus perception, we \nfound that these similarities occurred in different regions depending on the \ncondition. In addition, a voxel selectivity analysis revealed that only \nexpectation showed some evidence of cue-to-target generalization, and it did \nso in the ventral visual cortex. Finally, the representation of anticipated stimuli \ndid not correlate with behavior in either condition. \nFinally, after studying the nature of top-down preparation, we investigated \nhow the accuracy of prior induced representations changed through attention \nand expectation. Specifically, we set out to study whether cues sharpen or \ndampen sensory representations. To do so, we re-analyzed the data from the \ntwo experiments to draw joint conclusions. As a preliminary step, we set out \nto find evidence of separate activation differences for attention and \nexpectation. These analyses showed converging evidence of increased \nactivations for both likely and relevant stimuli. Regarding sharpening and \ndampening effects, the results mostly supported a sharpening effect for \nattention, and a marked dampening in expectation. In addition, we examined \nwhether the dampened representations would generalize better to the \npreparatory interval, as they should be poorer in both cases. Our hypothesis \nheld true, as expectation trials generalized to the signal, whereas relevant \ntargets did not. This again suggests sharpening for attended stimuli and \ndamping for probable stimuli. In the fMRI experiment we studied the \ninvolvement of frontoparietal regions in the sharpening and damping effects. \nAlthough we were able to successfully decode target categories in some frontoparietal areas, these regions showed no evidence of sharpening or \ndamping for either condition. Finally, we concluded that the results were not \nconsistent with equivalent effects for attention and expectation, suggesting \nthat not on
Author: González Peñalver, José María
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7011698491
Cites: 259
Cited by: 1
Related to: 10