Work

Rattling the Nuclear Saber: Rethinking Escalate-to-Deescalate Strikes

Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: Would a low-yield nuclear escalate-to-deescalate strike achieve its desired end of capitulation? Would the strike adequately demonstrate the willingness and ability of the escalator to impose greater compellent violence, “thereby giving the adversary pause for thought,” or would such a strike result in unintended consequences like continued fighting or counter-escalation (Freedman & Michaels, 2019, p. 667)? The answer to this question is critically important today with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian leaders’ overt and implied threats of nuclear use. Such events are especially concerning when combined with published Russian strategic doctrine, nuclear investments, messaging, and military exercises exemplifying their low-yield nuclear weapon escalate-to-deescalate concept. Despite the importance of this issue, current research on escalate-to-deescalate strikes does not address the conditions necessary to obtain the desired result of capitulation. This dissertation offers a new look at escalate-to-deescalate strikes throughout history to identify the requisite conditions to achieve capitulation and avoid the unintended responses of continued fighting or, even worse, counter-escalation. I argue that a victim’s response to an escalate-to-deescalate strike is the result of three variables: 1) its danger situation, 2) the value of the target struck, and 3) the damage sustained by the target, ex ante. Utilizing near-history case studies involving escalate-to-deescalate strikes to test this claim, I find that only a narrow set of conditions exist that are likely to result in the desired result of capitulation. Significantly, the results of these case studies also underscore both the high probability and the stark reality of failure of escalate-to-deescalate strikes.
Author: Loomis, Ryan
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7014570436
FWCI:
Cites: 256
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Related to: 10