A phenomenology of skill acquisition as the basis for a Merleau-Pontian nonrepresentational cognitive science
Type: article
Abstract: IntroductionExistential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations.This claim is expressed in two central concepts in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception 1 : the intentional arc and the tendency toward achieving a maximal grip.The intentional arc names the tight connection between the agent and the world, viz.that, as the agent acquires skills, these skills are "stored", not as representations in the mind, but as more and more refined dispositions to respond to the solicitations of more and more refined perceptions of the current situation.Maximum grip names the body's tendency to respond to these solicitations in such a way as to bring the current situation closer to the agent's sense of an optimal gestalt.I will argue that neither of these abilities requires mental or brain representations.Rather, simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent moves towards the sense of equilibrium that signals a maximum grip. II. Skill Acquisition: The Establishment of the Intentional Arc.According to Merleau-Ponty our skills are acquired by dealing with things and situations, and in turn they determine how things and situations show up for us as requiring our responses.To appreciate this claim we need to lay out more fully than Merleau-Ponty does how our relation to the world is transformed as we acquire a skill.
Author: Dreyfus, Hubert L.
Institution: University of California, Berkeley
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7023715432