Year: 2024
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: According to epistemic instrumentalists, epistemic facts (including about what we ought to believe, or about what is an (epistemic, normative) reason to believe what) obtain at least partly in virtue of our goals (or aims, ends, intentions, desires, etc.). 1 In this respect, epistemic normativity is dependent on our goals.Anti-instrumentalists deny this: they maintain that such facts don't obtain even partly in virtue of our goals (broadly construed, to include aims, ends, intentions, desires, etc.).In his contribution to this volume, Alex Worsnip (Forthcoming) defends anti-instrumentalism.While I reject many specific ways to defend epistemic instrumentalism -including some of the very same species of instrumentalism that Worsnip challenges -I think we should nonetheless reject antiinstrumentalism.Strictly speaking, it's false that epistemic normativity is entirely independent of our goals (where 'goals' is construed broadly enough to include aims).In fact -on the type of view I favour, telic virtue epistemology -epistemic normativity is inextricably aim-dependent -viz., relative to the aims (both intentional and teleological) of thinkers in trying to answer questions correctly (or knowledgeably).2 That said, the sense in which telic virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is aim dependent is one that easily 'falls between the cracks' in typical debates between epistemic instrumentalists and anti-instrumentalists.§1 does a bit of scene setting to explain why this is so -and in the course of doing so, I'll clarify the distinction between prescriptive and evaluative epistemic norms; and between substantive normativity and non-substantive normativity.Reference to these distinctions will help us see just how space opens up to resist epistemic anti-instrumentalism without signing up to any of the specific versions of instrumentalism that Worsnip explicitly takes issue with.§2 then lays out the non-substantive, evaluative epistemic normativity that is central to telic virtue epistemology, and in doing so, clarifies various ways in which epistemic normativity is aim dependent.§3 makes a few remarks in order to distinguish epistemic norms from wider, substantive zetetic norms, viz., norms that govern inquiry.1 I borrow this specific characterisation of epistemic instrumentalism from Worsnip (Forthcoming, X).2 This is just a first approximation; the details will be filled out in §2.§4 then revisits and sharpens of the key points of agreement between myself and Worsnip before registering where I take our dispute to really lie (while emphasising where it does not).
Author: Carter, J. Adam
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7028229636