Selective Schools
Year: 1999
Type: report
Abstract: This paper studies how schooling admission tests affect economic performance in an\neconomy where individuals are endowed with both academic and non academic abilities and\nboth abilities matter for labor productivity. We develop a simple model with selective\ngovernment held schools, where individuals signal their abilities by taking an admission test\nthat sorts them into different schools. When abilities are poorly correlated in the population,\nas documented in the literature, a standard test based only on academic abilities is expected\nto be less efficient than a more balanced test, that considers both ability types. Contrary to\nthis expectation, we show that this is not generally true, but depends both on the distribution\nof abilities in the population and on the marginal contribution of each ability type to individual\nproductivity. It is also not generally true that the outcome of a more balanced test can be\nreplicated by a sequential testing strategy, with government held schools testing academic\nabilities and firms testing non academic abilities on the sub-sample of graduates of elite\nschools.
Source: Econstor (Econstor)
Authors: Brunello, Giorgio, Giannini, Massimo
Institution: University of Rome Tor Vergata
Language: English
Subfield: Education
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7031727180
