Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: [email protected] In a recent article, Nathan Howard argues that normative reasons for action are to be identified not with facts, but with fact/goal pairs. For example, on Howard’s view, the reason in favor of me cooking the meal is not the fact that I promised—rather, it is that fact PLUS the goal to honor my promises. Howard supplies three arguments for his preferred view. In this reply I aim to do two things. The first is to undermine Howard’s three arguments. The second is to establish a dilemma for Howard’s preferred view. The upshot is a defense and development of the view that normative reasons for action are facts.
Author: Cunningham, J. J.
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7037805908
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