Security Analysis of Interdependent Critical Infrastructures: Power, Cyber and Gas
Year: 2018
Type: dissertation
Abstract: : Our daily life is becoming more and more reliant on services provided by the infrastructures\n\npower, gas , communication networks. Ensuring the security of these\n\ninfrastructures is of utmost importance. This task becomes ever more challenging as\n\nthe inter-dependence among these infrastructures grows and a security breach in one\n\ninfrastructure can spill over to the others. The implication is that the security practices/\n\nanalysis recommended for these infrastructures should be done in coordination.\n\nThis thesis, focusing on the power grid, explores strategies to secure the system that\n\nlook into the coupling of the power grid to the cyber infrastructure, used to manage\n\nand control it, and to the gas grid, that supplies an increasing amount of reserves to\n\novercome contingencies.\n\nThe first part (Part I) of the thesis, including chapters 2 through 4, focuses on\n\nthe coupling of the power and the cyber infrastructure that is used for its control and\n\noperations. The goal is to detect malicious attacks gaining information about the\n\noperation of the power grid to later attack the system. In chapter 2, we propose a\n\nhierarchical architecture that correlates the analysis of high resolution Micro-Phasor\n\nMeasurement Unit (microPMU) data and traffic analysis on the Supervisory Control\n\nand Data Acquisition (SCADA) packets, to infer the security status of the grid and\n\ndetect the presence of possible intruders. An essential part of this architecture is\n\ntied to the analysis on the microPMU data. In chapter 3 we establish a set of anomaly\n\ndetection rules on microPMU data that \n\nflag "abnormal behavior". A placement strategy\n\nof microPMU sensors is also proposed to maximize the sensitivity in detecting anomalies.\n\nIn chapter 4, we focus on developing rules that can localize the source of an events\n\nusing microPMU to further check whether a cyber attack is causing the anomaly, by\n\ncorrelating SCADA traffic with the microPMU data analysis results. The thread that\n\nunies the data analysis in this chapter is the fact that decision are made without fully estimating the state of the system; on the contrary, decisions are made using\n\na set of physical measurements that falls short by orders of magnitude to meet the\n\nneeds for observability. More specifically, in the first part of this chapter (sections 4.1-\n\n4.2), using microPMU data in the substation, methodologies for online identification of\n\nthe source Thevenin parameters are presented. This methodology is used to identify\n\nreconnaissance activity on the normally-open switches in the substation, initiated\n\nby attackers to gauge its controllability over the cyber network. The applications\n\nof this methodology in monitoring the voltage stability of the grid is also discussed.\n\nIn the second part of this chapter (sections 4.3-4.5), we investigate the localization\n\nof faults. Since the number of PMU sensors available to carry out the inference\n\nis insufficient to ensure observability, the problem can be viewed as that of under-sampling\n\na "graph signal"; the analysis leads to a PMU placement strategy that can\n\nachieve the highest resolution in localizing the fault, for a given number of sensors.\n\nIn both cases, the results of the analysis are leveraged in the detection of cyber-physical\n\nattacks, where microPMU data and relevant SCADA network traffic information\n\nare compared to determine if a network breach has affected the integrity of the system\n\ninformation and/or operations.\n\nIn second part of this thesis (Part II), the security analysis considers the adequacy\n\nand reliability of schedules for the gas and power network. The motivation for\n\nscheduling jointly supply in gas and power networks is motivated by the increasing\n\nreliance of power grids on natural gas generators (and, indirectly, on gas pipelines)\n\nas providing critical reserves. Chapter 5 focuses on unveiling the challenges and\n\nproviding solution to this problem.
Language: English
Subfield: Control and Systems Engineering
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7043537085
