Work

A Challenge for Humean Everettians

Year: 2023
Type: preprint
Abstract: I show that recent attempts to develop Humean Everettianism are inconsistent with the Principal Principle. Wilhelm (2022) develops an account of probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics that purports to solve the incoherence, quantitative, practical, and epistemic problems of probability faced by the Everett interpretation; he does so by linking probabilities to a Lewis-style Best System Analysis of the outcomes along branches, resulting in 'centered chances'. Unfortunately, this approach cannot work: it implies that intrinsic duplicates will have distinct credences at any time, and provides no account of which credence in particular any specific agent should adopt. As such, this view of probability does not provide a guide to action and severs the credence-chance link; I suggest general reasons that views of this ilk cannot provide a solution to the practical or epistemic problems. I develop this worry and argue that it stems from a conflation of two types of probability that come apart in many world settings. This distinction also helps explain where branch-counting approaches go wrong.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7046092784
Cites: 16
Cited by: 15
Related to: 9