“psyops”, 国家が関与するサイバー空間での情報操作:国際法の観点から
Year: 2023
Type: dissertation
Abstract: of the Dissertation"Psychological warfare", as the act of manipulating the information to change the mind of a predetermined target for strategic purposes, is now undergoing a major evolution: it is becoming "cyber-enabled."This is an opportunity to revisit the international law applicable to international communications and to elaborate under-developed areas of international law.1 Lt. Gen. Lori Reynolds in Andrew Milburn & Shawna Sinnott, "Competing for Influence: Operations in the Information Environment" (16 January 2021), Modern War Institute Irregular Affairs podcast, <https://mwi.usma.edu/competing-for-influence-operations-in-the-information-environment/>.exactly would state-sponsored disinformation campaigns breach international law?The next chapters provide an answer to this question.A third chapter looks at state-sponsored disinformation activities through the lenses of relevant international rules, principles and treaties safeguarding the interests of states against the behaviours of foreign actors.In doing so, it elicits the circumstances under which a foreign disinformation campaign could exceed the boundaries set by said rules.It is first shown that the 1936 Broadcasting Convention and the 1953 Correction Convention, albeit interesting in their approach to international communications, are difficult to operationalize in presence of covert, cyber-enabled activities.The assessment then turns to the customary principles of the non-use and threat of force and non-intervention.It is explained that these principles could find an application to the context of foreign disinformation activities in very limited circumstances.Note is for example taken of the contemporary debate pertaining to the need to re-interpret the non-intervention principle.It is however cautioned against tinkering the rules for the sole purpose of encompassing more modern forms of PSYOPS, as doing so risks rendering them meaningless, making them prone to instrumentalization by states.The fourth chapter focusses on human rights law.In covering the relevant rights, the chapter delineates the scopes of the freedom of thoughts and opinion, the right to internal selfdetermination and the right to life.It is thus shown that state-sponsored disinformation also infringes fundamental human rights.In fact, human right law seems the better approach to statesponsored disinformation.More specifically, is it noted that each one of the covered right could compensate for the lacunae of the aforementioned state-centric rules without entailing excessive risks of instrumentalization by states.The chapter concludes by suggesting an interpretation of human rights extraterritoriality that could give effectivity to the framework thus defined.The fifth and last chapter deals with the question of attribution and negligence.Notably, it is shown that classic attribution regimes may not provide an adequate path for the attribution of disinformation campaigns to a state, even when a connivence between a state and the private actors involved in the spread of disinformation is obvious.The means of responses in case of successful attribution remain extremely limited anyway.As a solution, it is suggested to look at state accountability from the perspective of the positive duties held by states with respect to the prevention of transboundary international law violations arising from activities perpetrated by private actors in their territories.In other words, information misuses should be looked at through the lenses of due diligence.Due diligence obligations must first be grounded in the law in order to exist.That is to say, duties of due diligence with respect to disinformation arise only if it is attested that disinformation campaigns are susceptible of breaching the law.On this point, this work shows that PSYOPS including disinformation may impair fundamental human rights, and even, in rare occasions, infringe on the rights of states.Hence, it is argued that a state of emission should incur liability for transboundary international law violations, including violations of human rights, arising from disinformation activities conducted by non-state actors operating from within its territory, or under its control, if it is apparent that said state was negligent in preventing information misuses it was entitled and in capacity to act upon.Additionally, it is recalled that under the consensual principle of territorial jurisdiction, recipient states are bound by obligations of prevention of human rights violations vis à vis their own population.This translates, in the disinformation context, in various due diligence duties to ensure that the collective will is protected against undue attempts to corrupt the authenticity of democratic processes in times of democratic elections, that adequate laws are in place to regulate egregious speeches, and, most importantly, that independent fact checking networks are not repressed and that sufficient resources are devoted to the development of information literacy.One may also think about an obligation of the receiving state to ensure that the largest service providers are diligent in preventing human right violation arising from information misuses in their platforms.The burden of prevention should be shared between states and digital platforms, as the latter's services enable psychological warfare.Thus, key social media platform owners should implement corporate due diligence duties in the context of their activities.Of course, even nonstate actors would be required to act diligently in prevention abuses arising from information misuses.This means, above all, that the platforms' own prevention efforts are not done to the detriment of the rights of the users.Therefore, social media platforms should devote more attention to designing recommender systems that are less manipulative and less prone to instrumentalization by an external actor.With that being said, corporate due diligence should not deviate attention from improving state accountability in the disinformation context.Too often psychological warfare is conducted in complete disregard for human rights.Thus, not only is it time to consolidate human rights in light of users' ever-growing vulnerability, but opening the possibility of engaging the responsibility of states and platforms for blatant negligence in dealing properly with disinformation campaigns seems a promising way forwards.Table of content General Introduction………………..……………………………………………………1 Chapter I. Conceptualizing state-sponsored online disinformation campaigns Concluding remarks…………………………………………………….…...
Authors: Letrone William, Axel, レットローム ウィリアム, アクセル
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7052124131
