Work

Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Lessons From South Africa

Year: 2006
Type: preprint
Abstract: We present a political economy model of a peaceful transition from autocracy to democracy, motivated by, and calibrated to, South Africa at the time of its own successful transition from white, elite rule under apartheid to today's multi-racial democracy.The primary barrier faced by South Africa in its transition is symptomatic of a central difficulty to peaceful transitions generally: How can the emerging majority credibly promise not to economically exploit the once ruling elite?South Africa found its answer in a form of governance we call democratic federalism.The central feature of such a constitution is to create an annual policy game -we study fiscal policy -where the new majority and the old elite each credibly control one policy instrument of central importance to the other party.In our version, the majority run central government decides all tax policy while provinces, at least one of which is politically controlled by the old elite, are assigned responsibility for providing important redistributive services.In effect, the federal constitution creates a policy "hostage game" between the new majority and the old elite in which each can check policy abuses by the other.We show that for plausible specifications of the political economy, this annual policy game has a stable, lessthan-fully exploitative stationary equilibrium that the elite may prefer to current autocratic rule.Our model "predicts" the current federal fiscal system of South Africa and then shows that under this system -which has proven stable at least over the past 12 years -the old economic elite will prefer democracy to apartheid provided their rate of time preference is less than the internal rate of return ( = .128)from South Africa's transition from autocracy to democratic federalism.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7056732447
Cites: 19
Cited by:
Related to: 9