Year: 2025
Type: preprint
Abstract: We study a two-player model of conflict with multiple battlefields -- the novel element is that each of the players has their own network of spillovers so that resources allocated to one battle can be utilized in winning neighboring battles. There exists a unique equilibrium in which the relative probability of a player winning a battle is the product of the ratio of the centrality of the battlefield in the two respective competing networks and the ratio of the relative cost of efforts of the two players. We study the design of networks and characterize networks that maximize total efforts and maximize total utility. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium of a game in which players choose both networks and efforts in the battles.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Dziubiński, Marcin, Goyal, Sanjeev, Zhou, Junjie
Institutions: University of Warsaw, University of Cambridge, Tsinghua University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7091186302
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