Work

Maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets with local monotonicity

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: We give formulas to obtain the maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets satisfying a local monotonicity condition. These formulas are obtained directly from the multisided array of data and we provide a core allocation where these bounds are attained. Similar formulas are known from Eriksson et al. (2000) for the bilateral Becker’s assortative assignment.

Source: Discrete Applied Mathematics

DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2025.10.006

Authors: F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Carlos Rafels, Neus Ybern

Institutions: Universitat de Barcelona, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,090