Lifetime Employment and a Sequential Choice in a Mixed Duopoly Market with a Joint-Stock Firm
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper examines a three-stage game model in which a joint-stock private firm and a state-owned public firm can sequentially offer lifetime employment before competing in quantities. The game runs as follows. First, the joint-stock private firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment. Second, the state-owned public firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment. Third, both firms choose their outputs simultaneously and independently. The paper demonstrates that there is an equilibrium solution where only the joint-stock private firm offers lifetime employment.
Author: Ohnishi, Kazuhiro
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W7093328875
FWCI:
Cites:
Cited by:
Related to: