Making Sense of Embodiment: Simulation Theories and the Sharing of Neural Circuitry Between Sensorimotor and Cognitive Processes
Year: 2004
Type: article
Abstract: Although an increasing number of cognitive scientists are convinced that cognition is embodied, there still is relatively little agreement on what exactly that means.Notions of what it actually means for a cognizer to be embodied range from simplistic ones such as 'being physical' or 'interacting with an environment' to more demanding ones that consider a particular morphology or a living body prerequisites for embodied cognition.Based on experimental evidence from a range of disciplines, we argue that one of the keys to understanding the embodiment of cognition is the sharing of neural mechanisms between sensorimotor processes and higher-level cognitive processes.The latter are argued to be embodied in the sense that they make use of (partial) simulations or emulations of sensorimotor processes through the re-activation of neural circuitry also active in bodily perception and action.
Authors: Henrik Svensson, Tom Ziemke
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2593545136