Work

The Narrative Self-Constitution View: Why Marya Schechtman Cannot Require it for Personhood

Year: 2011
Type: article
Abstract: In her book The Constitution of Selves, Marya Schechtman names four features essential for personal existence: survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation.She rejects reductionists theories of persons, specifically that of Derek Parfit, claiming that they cannot support the four features.Instead, she proposes a theory of persons which she calls the Narrative Self-Constitution View.Because she believes this is required to support the four features, she also argues that for an individual to be a person they must hold this view.Drawing from the work of Derek Parfit and Galen Strawson, I will argue that her arguments are inconsistent and do not show that reductionist theories cannot support the four features.As a result, I conclude that Schechtman is wrong to require the Narrative Self-Constitution View for personhood.This paper will deal with the theory of personal identity proposed by Marya Schechtman in her book, The Constitution of Selves. 1 In this work, Schechtman claims that there are four basic features of personal existence: survival, moral responsibility, self-
Source: HIMALAYA
Author: Stuart Lane
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W165225779
FWCI:
Cites: 3
Cited by: 7
Related to: 9