Wage-Rise Contract and Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper investigates a mixed duopoly environment in which a private firm competes on price with a public firm. The following timing of actions is considered. In the first stage, each firm non-cooperatively decides whether to adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment device. If a firm adopts a wage-rise contract, then it chooses an output level and a wage premium rate, and agrees to pay each employee a wage premium uniformly if it actually produces more than the output level. This irreversible behaviour causes changes to the price-competing market environment of the second stage. The paper presents the equilibrium solution of the mixed duopoly model.
Author: Ohnishi, Kazuhiro
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7103975678
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