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Unilateral Decisions to Hire Managers in Markets with Capitalist and Labor-Managed Firms

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: This paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of firms’ decision games to hire managers when there is a capitalist firm competing against a labor-managed firm. The paper shows that if only the capitalist firm hires a manager, then the equilibrium coincides with the solution when neither firm hires a manager. In addition, the paper shows that if only the labor-managed firm hires a manager, then at equilibrium the capitalist firm’s output and the market price are lower than when neither firm hires a manager.

Source: International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17557450

Author: Ohnishi, Kazuhiro

Language: English

Topic: Merger and Competition Analysis

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: diamond

OpenAlex ID: W7104440936

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