Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Much recent work in philosophy of memory discusses the question whether episodic remembering is continuous with imagining. This paper contributes to the debate between continuists and discontinuists by considering a previously neglected source of evidence \(\underline {for}\) continuism: the linguistic properties of overt memory and imagination reports (e.g. sentences of the form \(\it 'x\) remembers/imagines \(\it p'\)). I argue that the distribution and truth-conditional contribution of episodic uses of the English verb \(\it remember\) is surprisingly similar to that of the verb \(\it imagine\) – even when compared to the distribution of other experiential attitude verbs like \(\textit {see, hallucinate}\), or \(\it dream\). This holds despite the presence of some remarkable truth-conditional differences between \(\it remember\) and \(\it imagine\). I show how these differences can be explained by a continuist account of remembering, on which remembering is past-directed, referential, and accurate experiential imagining.
Author: Liefke, Kristina (Jun.-Prof. Dr.)
Institution: Ruhr University Bochum
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7111740000
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