Explanatory pluralism in political science
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Most writers on political science methods seem to suggest that explanation means causal explanation. Certainly, many explanations in the political sciences are causal. However, natural science often provides non-causal explanations, while non-causal explanations are recognized by philosophers of science. Causal inference, in itself, is not a causal explanation; it explains alongside theory. In this paper, we defend explanatory pluralism, arguing that many important explanations in political science are not causal in nature. We identify two important types of non-causal explanation – constitutive explanation (CE) and explanation by constraint (EC) – providing examples from the political sciences literature. We conclude by outlining what we believe non-causal explanation can contribute to political science.
Source: Journal of Theoretical Politics
Authors: Keith Dowding, Charles Miller
Institution: Australian National University
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,650
OpenAlex ID: W7116449017