Work

Optimal Job Design and Information Elicitation

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT When managers rely on their subordinates for local information but cannot commit to how such information is used, the incentives for effort and information elicitation become intertwined. This incentive problem influences the firm's job design decision, that is, whether to assign all tasks in a job to one worker (“individual assignment”) or split those among a group (“team assignment”). Team assignment facilitates information elicitation but suffers from diseconomies of scope in incentive provision. The optimal job design is driven by the workers' likelihood of being informed (about local conditions) and the noise in the performance measure used to reward them.

Source: The RAND Journal of Economics

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70037

Authors: Arijit Mukherjee, Zijian Qi, Luis Vasconcelos

Institutions: Michigan State University, Texas Tech University, University of Technology Sydney, NOVA School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,400