Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This study examines decision-making in intelligent virtual agents (IVAs) and formalizes the distinction between tactical decisions (individual actions) and strategic decisions (composed of sequences of tactical actions) using a mathematical model based on set theory and the Bellman equation. Although the equation itself is not modified, the analysis reveals that the discount factor (γ) influences the type of decision: low values favor tactical decisions, while high values favor strategic ones. The model was implemented and validated in a proof-of-concept simulated environment, namely the Snake Coin Change Problem (SCCP), using a Deep Q-Network (DQN) architecture, showing significant differences between agents with different decision profiles. These findings suggest that adjusting γ can serve as a useful mechanism to regulate both tactical and strategic decision-making processes in IVAs, thus offering a conceptual basis that could facilitate the design of more intelligent and adaptive agents in domains such as video games, and potentially in robotics and artificial intelligence as future research directions.
DOI: 10.3390/mca31010008
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,689
Funder: Eurostars
OpenAlex ID: W7119132578
