Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: In cases of fission a thing or person splits into two things or persons. It is often thought that in cases of fission the thing or person which fissions could not be numerically identical with one result of fission rather than the other, on the grounds that it would be objectionably arbitrary for the thing or person to end up as one result of fission rather than the other. I show that this sort of argument fails. Two fission cases which receive special attention are split-brain transplants (where each brain hemisphere is transplanted into a different body) and monozygotic twinning.
Source: Erkenntnis
Author: Andrew Brenner
Institution: Hong Kong Baptist University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,290
Funder: Hong Kong Baptist University
OpenAlex ID: W7122660010