Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments they can perform (i.e., their type). We show that the sender cannot attain their commitment payoff in any equilibrium if (i) the receiver is sufficiently uncertain about their type and (ii) the sender could benefit from selective disclosure after conducting their full-commitment optimal experiment. Otherwise, there can be equilibria where the sender obtains their commitment payoff.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Dai, Yifan, Fudenberg, Drew, Pei, Harry
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7123267013
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