Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: According to the Balancing View of Ought, we ought to perform an action if and only if performing the action is most strongly supported by the balance of our reasons. The Balancing View faces the objection from exclusionary reasons, which are second-order reasons not to act for certain other reasons. According to Joseph Raz, the existence of exclusionary reasons undermines the Balancing View: a reason might tip the balance in favour of performing an act but at the same time be excluded by an undefeated second-order reason, in which case one ought not conform to the balance of reasons. This article argues that the Balancing View can be defended against this objection and that the existence of exclusionary reasons is compatible with the Balancing View.
Author: Kiesewetter, Benjamin
Institution: Bielefeld University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: European Commission
Award: G8484094376
OpenAlex ID: W7123285471
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