Work

Efficient communication in organizations

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver in binary decision-making problems. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by resolving information asymmetries without incurring these costs—i.e., by attaining the complete-information outcome. Only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and sequential structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations seeking to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.

Source: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107420

Author: Federico Vaccari

Institution: University of Bergamo

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,180

Funder: Università degli Studi G. d'Annunzio Chieti - Pescara