Bilateral Cognitive Security Games in Networked Control Systems under Stealthy Injection Attacks
Year: 2025
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each possessing cognitive reasoning abilities. The adversary with an adversarial cognitive ability attacks strategically selected interconnections of the system with the aim of disrupting the network performance while remaining stealthy to the defender. Meanwhile, the defender with a defensive cognitive ability monitors strategically selected nodes to impose the stealthiness constraint with the purpose of minimizing the worst-case disruption caused by the adversary. Within the proposed bilateral cognitive security framework, the preferred cognitive levels of the two strategic agents are formulated in terms of two newly proposed concepts, cognitive mismatch and cognitive resonance. Moreover, we propose a method to compute the policies for the defender and the adversary with arbitrary cognitive abilities. A sufficient condition is established under which an increase in cognitive levels does not alter the policies for the defender and the adversary, ensuring convergence. The obtained results are validated through numerical simulations.
Authors: Anh Tung Nguyen, Quanyan Zhu, André Teixeira
Institutions: Uppsala University, New York University
Language: English
Subfield: Control and Systems Engineering
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7123352761
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