Work

Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The main findings of the experiment are corroborated by a vignette study on the acceptability of kidney sales. The results point to policies that can mitigate repugnance.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001

Authors: Hande Erkut, Dorothea Kübler

Institutions: WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Technische Universität Berlin

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,720