Work

Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs

Year: 2026

Type: preprint

Abstract: We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are strategic substitutes under a disclosure cost but complements under a concealment cost. Additional senders thus impede any sender's disclosure under a disclosure cost but promote it under a concealment cost. In the former case, a decision maker can be harmed by additional senders, even when senders have opposing interests. The effects under both kinds of message costs turn on how a sender, when concealing his information, expects others' messages to systematically sway the decision maker's belief.

Source: arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2601.10048

Authors: Kartik, Navin, Lee, Frances Xu, Suen, Wing

Institutions: Yale University, Loyola University Chicago, University of Hong Kong

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: National Science Foundation

Award: Would More Information Reduce Disagreement? Theory and Applications

OpenAlex ID: W7124430966

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