Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: There is a debate about whether hypocritical blame is wrong per se. Extant views of hypocritical blame are insufficient, I argue, because they fail to appreciate the significance of the fact that hypocrisy comes in degrees. I argue that the more hypocritical an instance of blame is, the stronger the pro tanto reason there is against blaming. My view allows us to capture the intuition that there is something problematic about hypocritical blame while avoiding the pitfall of regarding all instances of hypocritical blame as equally inappropriate. I argue for a commitment-based view of hypocrisy according to which one’s blame is more hypocritical the less one is committed to the norm one blames another for transgressing. I argue that hypocrisy makes one’s blame an inaccurate signal of one’s commitments, and that the more hypocritical one’s blame is, the more inaccurate the signal. The more inaccurate the signal, the stronger the pro tanto reason against blaming.
Source: The Journal of Value Inquiry
Author: Sam Ridge
Institution: University of California San Diego
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W7124764822