Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT Philosophers working on the metaphysics of persistence typically do not extend their views to the distinctness of objects at a single time. I argue that we can provide criteria to distinguish objects across time if and only if we can provide criteria to distinguish objects at a time. Furthermore, I endorse a stronger claim. If either diachronic or synchronic distinctness facts have an analysis, then they have a common analysis. In other words, we should analyze diachronic and synchronic distinctness facts in the same way.
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70086
Author: Erica Shumener
Institution: Syracuse University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,900
OpenAlex ID: W7124890239
