On the thorny question of impossible antecedents
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: There are essentially three ways to treat conditionals with impossible antecedents in a formal framework that employs classical truth values: one can hold that such conditionals are all true, that they are all false, or that some are true while others are false. These three options will be examined under the background hypothesis that a conditional is true when its antecedent is incompatible with the negation of its consequent. It will be argued that the third option can be coherently developed by defining a suitable notion of compatibility.
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaf103
Author: Andrea Iacona
Institution: University of Turin
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $4,204
OpenAlex ID: W7124929116