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Group Agency and Egalitarian Corporate Structure: The Epistemic, Incentive, and Control Dimensions

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT What constitutes a good corporate agent? The article answers this question by critically applying List and Pettit's theory of group agency, which emphasizes three crucial dimensions of organizational design: epistemic quality, incentive compatibility, and control. Integrating empirical insights from sociology and organizational studies, we argue that List and Pettit's framework implies a non‐contingent relationship between good corporate agents and egalitarian structures. This article makes two contributions: (1) it enriches debates in the political theory of the firm by clarifying how group agency concepts impact the normative understanding of corporate structures; (2) it strengthens the normative foundations of List and Pettit's framework by situating their theoretical criteria within empirical evidence of organizational effectiveness.

Source: Journal of Applied Philosophy

DOI: 10.1002/japp.70071

Authors: Chi Kwok, Chris Man‐Kong Li

Institutions: Lingnan University, Hang Seng University of Hong Kong

Language: English

Topic: Political Philosophy and Ethics

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,980