Individual differences in mentalizing skills and their relationship to concept processing
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Multiple representation theories of lexical semantics assume meaning is retrieved through simulation. However, simulation mechanisms are not well understood. Mental state inferencing – the capacity to understand mental states – has been proposed as a simulation mechanism, particularly for cognitive concepts (concepts referring to cognitive events, states, and products) ( Kiefer et al., 2022 ). In a pre-registered study, we tested this proposal using an individual differences approach. Adult participants ( n = 297) completed three measures of mentalizing skills. They also completed two syntactic classification tasks (is this word a verb; is this word a noun?) to measure semantic processing and test for the cognition effect (more cognitive words processed more efficiently than less cognitive words). We replicated the cognition effect, with high-cognition words eliciting faster and more accurate responses than low-cognition words. Additionally, we found significant interactions between mentalizing and the cognition effect: participants with stronger mentalizing skills showed larger cognition effects. This relationship suggests that mentalizing may serve as a simulation mechanism when accessing word meaning. • Word meaning is proposed to be grounded in multiple systems. • Mentalizing may be a grounding mechanism for cognitive concepts. • Semantic processing facilitated for mental-state words (cognition effect). • People differ in their capacity to reflect on their own and others' mental states. • Individual differences in mentalizing are related to the cognition effect.
Source: Acta Psychologica
Authors: Hannah T. Corenblum, Penny M. Pexman
Institution: Western University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,670
OpenAlex ID: W7127940418