Populist resilience to corruption: Institutional, partisan, and discursive strategies in Hungary and Turkey
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: While populists are often helped into power by anti-corruption rhetoric, they are not exempt from corruption (allegations) that could threaten their credibility and political survival. This article aims to explain how populist leaders manage corruption and remain resilient in competitive authoritarian (hybrid) regimes. Building on the literature on authoritarian regime stability and autocratic legitimation, it identifies three interrelated strategies – institutional, partisan, and discursive – corresponding to the functional pillars of stability – repression, co-optation, and legitimation. Comparative case studies of Hungary and Turkey illustrate that populist leaders recalibrate these strategies over time to sustain resilience to corruption: they rely primarily on partisan strategies early on, shift towards institutional strategies as regimes consolidate, and increasingly employ discursive strategies under heightened constraints, often alongside aggressive measures targeting both opposition actors and, when necessary, insiders. The article contributes to the literature on populism and corruption by theorising corruption management as a central component of populist rule and resilience.
Source: Politics
Authors: Digdem Soyaltin-Colella, Robert Csehi
Institutions: University of Aberdeen, Corvinus University of Budapest
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,650
OpenAlex ID: W7128058721