Work

Why Trivialist Platonism Cannot be Both Trivialist and Platonist

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT Platonism is the view according to which entities such as numbers and properties, characterized as abstract objects, exist. Agustín Rayo argues that the truth conditions for statements about mathematical objects and properties make no demands on the world and are, in this way, trivial. The result is trivialist platonism. In this paper, we question the stability of the two central features of the view: it cannot be both trivialist and platonist.

Source: Analytic Philosophy

DOI: 10.1111/phib.70002

Authors: Javier Cumpa, Otávio Bueno

Institutions: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, University of Miami, Tohoku University

Language: English

Topic: Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: bronze