The state and status of theory in psychological science
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Psychology’s theory problem, long noted since Meehl, persists: most theories are verbal, underspecified, and make weak predictions, so hypotheses rarely follow from theory and findings seldom constrain it. Historical empiricism and today’s incentives (novelty, significance, volume) favor flexible, low-risk, strategically vague theorizing, while reforms and training emphasize methods over theory construction and formal/computational modeling. The result is fragmented subfields, drifting constructs, and “effects” that don’t cumulate—fueling replication failures, post-hoc rationalization, and shallow applied progress. Improving epistemic design requires educating and rewarding precise, falsifiable theories.
Authors: Noah N'Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Andreas Glöckner, Philipp Musfeld, Alexandra Sarafoglou, Denny Borsboom, Laura Francina Bringmann, Markus Eronen, Kyra Evers, Willem Frankenhuis, Eiko I Fried, Jonas M B Haslbeck, Marieke A. Helmich, Pritam Laskar, Caspar J. Van Lissa, Richard McElreath, Jason Nak, Freek Oude Maatman, Vencislav Popov, Donald Robinaugh, Anne M. Scheel, Han L. J. van der Maas, Leonhard Volz, Meike Waaijers, Andrea Wittenborn, Luiza Yuan
Language: English
Subfield: General Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7128600353