Access to Care in a Capacity-Constrained System: Do Coverage Expansions Improve Health Outcomes? Evidence from U.S. States, 2006–2023
Year: 2026
Type: article
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: Coverage expansions and affordability reforms often presume that improved access to care yields better population health. We examine this premise in a capacity-constrained healthcare system, where congestion and throughput determine whether potential access translates into realized care. Using U.S. state-year panel data from 2006 to 2023, we study (i) how healthcare workforce density relates to multiple access margins and (ii) whether the mortality effects of access improvements depend on local delivery capacity. Reduced-form estimates show that higher workforce density is associated with higher insurance coverage and fewer cost-related barriers to care, while associations with having a usual source of care are weaker. With full controls these relationships attenuate, and Medicaid expansion and poverty explain much of the remaining variation. Instrumental variable models suggest that policy-driven improvements in effective access are associated with lower mortality, although the first-stage strength varies across specifications. Interaction-IV estimates indicate capacity dependence: for all-cause and external-cause mortality, implied benefits are larger in lower-capacity settings and diminish as workforce density increases; for endocrine mortality, benefits are concentrated in higher-capacity settings, while respiratory effects are not detectable. Overall, the results support a systems perspective in which the health returns to access expansions depend on local delivery capacity, underscoring the importance of aligning access reforms with constraints in healthcare production and flow.
Source: Systems
Authors: Bedassa Tadesse, Iftu Dorose
Institution: University of Minnesota, Duluth
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,896
OpenAlex ID: W7130934133
