Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Some philosophers argue that pragmatist accounts of causation require accepting perspectivalism—the view that causation depends on an agent’s perspective. This paper critically evaluates this inference by examining Price’s arguments for perspectivalism and against Woodward’s view. I demonstrate that Price’s positive argument rests on an unacceptable premise, and drawing on Woodward’s work, I propose a pragmatist realist view of causation that survives Price’s criticisms. This pragmatist realism identifies causes through human concerns and practices, but treats the causal relation as objective and independent of agential perspectives. The paper concludes by showing Ismael’s perspectivalist view is consistent with pragmatist realism.
Source: Philosophy of Science
Author: Jason DeWitt
Institution: The Ohio State University
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W7131647237
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