Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Does Benatar’s anti-natalism – the view that it is better never to have been – imply that death is better than continued living? This is known as the pro-mortalist question, a compelling, unresolved question surrounding anti-natalist discourse. In order to answer this question, I analyse two theories about the badness of death that Benatar uses to argue against the idea that anti-natalism implies pro-mortalism. The first is that death deprives one of the good things in life. The second is that death annihilates the person. However, I argue that these theories fail to block pro-mortalism. As such, I conclude that Benatar’s anti-natalism implies pro-mortalism, suggesting that if it is better never to have been, then it is better to cease to be.
Source: Utilitas
Author: C. J. Leak
Institution: University of Birmingham
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W7131786937