Un passé personnel sans identité : la dépendance de la théorie néo-lockéenne de l’identité personnelle vis-à-vis des théories causales de la mémoire
Year: 2025
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The title of this thesis announces its objective: to find a definition of memory that is identity-less: that is, one that does not presuppose personal identity, so that memory can, in turn, constitute personal identity. Throughout this research, I will aim to demonstrate that such a theoretical position can be achieved by adopting and aligning with simulationism. This is not merely a matter of loosening the causal condition to arrive at a weaker version of quasi memory; rather, it is a move that enables the neo-Lockean view of personal identity to avoid circularity while still defining personal identity through the sameness of consciousness, as originally proposed by Locke.
Source: HAL
Author: Lee Vanbeveren, Anita
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7134100834
