Year: 2025
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This thesis studies a simplified version of poker to understand the logic behind bluffing and decision making when players have private information. Instead of analyzing a full-scale complex poker system, this thesis aims to deconstruct the workings of poker using a reduced model with only two card types, Aces and Kings. The model builds on and extends the framework introduced in Reiley et al.’s “Stripped-Down Poker” (2008) by bringing in different player types and analyzing how their distribution affects optimal bluffing behavior. The players in this reduced model are of two types: Behavioral (players who always bet no matter what hand they have) and Rational (players who change their strategy based on their hand). This paper uses basic game theory concepts to study the equilibria of this reduced model. This thesis aims to connect the simplified model to real-world poker and related economic settings and discusses how behavioral biases further impact strategic decision-making under uncertainty. Future research of this topic could include additional rounds of betting, more complex card structures, and expanded player types to better reflect the multiple layers of actual poker gameplay.
Author: Vanukuri, Mohith Reddy
Institution: University of Arizona
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7134156429
