Work

Doomsday or Multiverse Bias

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT Bayesian epistemology faces serious challenges when dealing with self‐locating evidence. This paper argues that, given two modest assumptions about how confirmation should work (Patterning and Live Centers), Bayesianism faces an unavoidable dilemma. We must either accept an implausible form of reasoning where our mere existence provides evidence that the future is short (Doomsday), or accept an equally implausible form where our existence favors hypotheses positing vastly more observers (Multiverse Bias). Since the underlying assumptions are hard to deny, and both horns of the dilemma are deeply unpalatable, this result reveals a major problem for Bayesian epistemology.

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70103

Author: Yoaav Isaacs

Institution: Baylor University

Language: English

Topic: Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,900

OpenAlex ID: W7134205198

FWCI:

Cites: 13

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