Mereological Sums via Abstraction Principles
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: An object is said to be thin when its existence makes no demands on reality beyond those already made by the existence of certain other objects. Mereological sums are often taken to be thin in this sense, since many metaphysicians have maintained that a sum is nothing over and above the objects that compose it. In this paper, I develop an abstractionist account of the existence and thinness of mereological sums. Specifically, I show that Classical Extensional Mereology and Universalist Mereology , a much weaker non-extensional system that does not prove any supplementation principle, can both be axiomatized via appropriate abstraction principles for sums. I conclude by commenting on the philosophical significance of these results.
Source: Philosophical Studies
Author: Pietro Berardi Gili
Institution: University of Geneva
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W7134227459