The accountability dilemma in mass purges
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Despite expectations that large-scale anti-corruption campaigns would enhance governance, they often lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and economic decline, as seen in China and Vietnam. This paper examines these purges as a top-down accountability mechanism in authoritarian regimes. Through a game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that systemic corruption traps rulers in a persistent trade-off between social productivity and political stability. Whether rulers incentivize informants, distinguish between ideologically congruent and non-congruent agents, prioritize profit or survival, or base purges on corruption or performance, the core dilemma remains-and often becomes more intricate. Our findings challenge the effectiveness of mass purges as a sustainable governance strategy.
Source: Journal of Theoretical Politics
Author: Xiaoli Guo
Institution: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7137806084