Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: A number of recent philosophers have argued that our first-personal access to our beliefs is explained by the fact that we make transparent transitions : causal transitions between worldly mental states and second-order beliefs based on those worldly mental states. In this paper, I argue (i) that our first-personal access to some past beliefs cannot be explained by transparent transitions and (ii) that this casts doubt on the view that our first-personal access to any of our beliefs, past or present, is explained by transparent transitions. I argue further that the same problem arises for transitional theories for other mental states, such as desires.
Source: Synthese
Author: Luke Capek
Institutions: Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W7140090287