Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Whether or not large language models (LLMs) can be said to have representational attitudes like beliefs (or motivational attitudes like intentions) remains an open question. In this paper I argue that on some commonly accepted views about belief, LLMs, given their structure, are not capable of having beliefs. To do so, I draw from the normativity of belief literature to distinguish three types of views about the kinds of things beliefs are. The first category of view includes those which deny that there are any norms of belief at all, in any sense. The second category of views are those which allow that there might exist, in some way or another, a norm of belief, but hold that this is only true in a trivial or purely conceptual sense. I will call these the mere constitutivist accounts. The third category of views are any that suggest a stronger normative picture for the norm of belief. I’ll refer to these views as normativism about belief. My hope is to show that if either the mere constituivist or normativist accounts about belief are correct, then LLMs are not capable of having attitudes like beliefs or intentions.
Source: Synthese
Author: Camila Hernandez Flowerman
Institution: Bentley University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W7140111701